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the impact of a multiple principal-agent problem on communication risk in 
construction projects is addressed. the focus here is on communication issues 
between the project owner, the contractor, and their project managers, as 
well as between the two project managers working for them. These are the 
key four parties in any construction project. In construction projects, the 
principal-agent problem is even more pronounced than is usually the 
case because of their short-term employment relationship. This problem 
is characterized by three issues concerning the relationship between the 
principal and the agent: adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-up. 
Asymmetric information is common to all three. An exploratory survey was 
conducted in order to establish an understanding of the relative impor-
tance of the relationships between the key project parties in terms of the 
above communication risks. The respondents were project managers with 
considerable experience in the construction field. They agree that the 
main relationship in a construction project before the contract is signed 
is that between the project owner and contractor. However, they suggest 
that the main relationship after the contract is signed is that between 
the project owner’s and contractor’s project managers, both of whom 
are agents, which points to new and promising areas for further research.
INTRODUCTION
Good communication between project 
participants is crucial for project suc�
cess. Poor communication is one of 
the most common project risks (Ceric, 
2003; Zerjav and Ceric, 2009). Commu�
nication within construction projects 
is a multifaceted phenomenon span�
ning multiple disciplinary fields, mul�
tiple organizational levels, as well as 
multiple perspectives and interpreta�
tions. Participants need to collaborate, 
share, collate, and integrate signifi�
cant amounts of information to realize 
project objectives (Emmitt and Gorse, 




Information asymmetry is the situa�
tion in which one of the two parties is 
better informed than the other. One of 
the best known applications of infor�
mation asymmetry in economics is the 
principal-agent problem (e.g., Jäger, 
2008). Either buyers or sellers do not 
have reliable information about a par�
ticular product or service. For example, 
a project owner as buyer is less well 
informed about the quality of a con�
structed facility than a contractor as 
seller. Similarly, a contractor as buyer 
is better informed about the key char�
acteristics of a construction project—
such as time, cost, and quality—than an 
insurance company as seller of project 
insurance, for instance.
The project owner and the contrac�
tor form the key relationship in con�
struction projects (Turner and Müller, 
2004). Delegation of tasks establishes 
a principal�agent relationship between 
the project owner and contractor, where 
the principal (project owner) depends 
on the agent (contractor) to undertake 
a task on the principal’s behalf (Müller 
and Turner, 2005). One can act on as�
sumption that agents will try to maxi�
mize their own benefit even when that 
may involve a higher damage to the 
client (Schieg, 2008). This problem is 
characterized by three issues of risk 
concerning the relationship between 
the principal and the agent: adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and hold�up. 
Briefly, adverse selection occurs when 
the principal does not have the exact 
qualifications of the agent before the 
contract is signed. In the case of moral 
hazard, the principal cannot be sure 
that the agent will fully act on the princi�
pal’s behalf after the contract is signed. 
Hold�up occurs when the principal has 
invested some resources in the belief 
that the agent will behave appropriately, 
but the agent acts opportunistically af�
ter the contract is signed (Jäger, 2008; 
Schieg, 2008).
In this paper, the multiple principal�
agent problem in construction projects 
is addressed. The three issues men�
tioned above are central to the argu�
ment. What makes this paper different 
from those published so far is that the 
focus here will be on communication is�
sues between four parties involved in 
construction projects: project owner, 
contractor, and their project manag�
ers. In the literature we can find “clas�
sical” principal�agent theory applied 
to construction projects that discusses 
issues between the project owner and 
the project manager working on the 
project owner’s behalf, as well as the 
contractor and the contractor’s suppli�
ers, but none have discussed the rela�
tionships and communication risks of 
all four parties mentioned above, who 
perforce play the most important role 
in every construction project.
Of course, other participants may 
play important roles in construction 
projects. These include consultants, 
such as designers, and sub�contractors. 
However, the four parties discussed 
here play key roles in all construction 
projects, as project owners and contrac�
tors typically engage project managers. 
Moreover, project managers involved in 
construction projects are typically pro�
fessionals concerned with a wide vari�
ety of construction�related disciplines, 
most often based in civil engineering. 
This is why they have been selected for 
special attention in this research.
It should be mentioned that many 
papers using the principal�agent frame�
work can be found in the construction 
literature. They cover a wide spectrum 
of issues, which do not warrant detailed 
analysis here because they do not ad�
dress the four key parties discussed 
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in this paper, but the most important 
among these papers have been classi�
fied by the key principal�agent theory 
issues—adverse selection, moral haz�
ard, and hold�up. Potentially useful to 
future researchers in the field, the clas�
sification is presented in Table 1. It of�
fers an indication of the relative impor�
tance of the key issues covered by the 
construction literature. To date, moral 
hazard has attracted most attention in 
the construction field, followed by ad�
verse selection. The hold�up issue has 
attracted least attention so far.
In the pages that follow, the prin�
cipal�agent theory framework in con�
struction projects is first introduced. 
Special emphasis is placed on the 
communication risk in connection with 
asymmetric information. Then an ex�
ploratory survey of project managers 
is presented. Collectively, they bring 
considerable expertise, and their per�
ceptions of communication risks are 
central to this paper because they 
play important roles in all construc�
tion projects. A section is thus dedi�
cated to these perceptions. The main 
findings of the survey follow. They are 
largely qualitative in nature, but they 
provide sufficient guidance for future 
research. In particular, the relationship 
between project managers as agents 
in the construction phase of a project 
deserves greater attention. The paper 
closes with conclusions that focus on 
future research.
Principal-Agent Theory 
Framework for Construction 
Projects
The owner of a project is the person or 
group that provides the financial resources 
for its delivery, accepts the project mile�
stones, and project completion (Project 
Management Institute, 2000). The project 
owner hires a contractor to perform all the 
activities required to complete the project. 
According to the principal�agent theory, 
the relationship between the two parties 
also involves self interest of each party, 
which is also shown in Figure 1.
Also, the project owner and the contrac�
tor delegate their tasks to their proj�
ect managers. Therefore, there are four 
different parties involved in the proj�
ect even before its execution starts. It 
should be noted that the contractor’s 
project manager is understood here as 
the person who is in overall charge of 
a particular project on contractor’s be�
half irrespective of the title. Namely, in 
some business environments this role 
is played by consultants.
However, it is important to note that 
project owner’s and contractor’s proj�
ect managers play important roles in 
any construction project even though 
they are not in a contractual relationship 
with each other. They can be praised or 
blamed for success or failure of the proj�
ect and they thus have a great moral re�
sponsibility (Corvellec and Macheridas, 
2010). Because they are so important for 
the success of any project, their percep�
tions of communication risks between 
the key participants in construction 
projects should be explored in greater 
detail, which has not been done before.
It is commonly assumed that all 
participants in the project will work 
smoothly together in order to achieve 
the same goal. However, there is a po�
tential conflict of interests between the 
participants because they all have their 
self interests, too. Extending Figure 1, 
the relationships between all the above 
mentioned participants taken together 
are shown in Figure 2. These are the 
key parties to any construction project. 
Considering only pairs of these parties, 
as is commonly the case in the existing 
literature, obscures the complexity of 
these relationships. The relationship 
between project managers, which has 
been neglected so far, is thus set in its 
proper context.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the proj�
ect owner acts as the principal in rela�
tion to both the project owner’s project 
manager and contractor as agents, and 
the contractor acts as the principal in 
relation to the contractor’s project man�
ager. Therefore, there are two princi�
pals and three agents involved, where 
the contractor is both the principal and 
agent in a project. This is why this com�
plex set of relationships can be called 
a multiple principal�agent problem that 
needs to be addressed in the context of 
human resources management. Again, 
Figure 2 shows the key relationships 
that occur in every construction project.
The project owner provides the fi�
nancial resources and hires the contrac�
tor. This is the key relationship in this 
case. According to Turner and Müller 
(2004), the owner is particularly inter�
ested in the following:
 X the end deliverable will meet their 
functional requirements
 X the right project process is being fol�
lowed to successfully deliver the re�
quired end deliverables in the opti�
mum way
 X the project will meet the required 
quality, budget, and schedule 
requirements
 X appropriate control mechanisms are 
in place to achieve the above
 X the project manager is behaving in a 
professional and trustworthy manner
The project owner hires a project man�
ager in order to achieve the goals of 
the project. The project owner’s project 
manager works closely with the con�
tractor’s project manager and monitors 








Figure 1: Project Owner - Contractor relationship 
(PO: Project Owner C: Contractor)
525
ect manager takes to achieve the goals 
of the project, but also to satisfy the 
project owner. The project owner and 
contractor communicate in two ways: 
directly and indirectly—through their 
project managers. Although all four par�
ties ostensibly have the same goal, they 
have their own self interests, as well. 
Some of the information will be shared 
only when the participants are willing 
to do so. 
The situation in which one of the 
two cooperation partners is better in�
formed than the other is characterized 
by asymmetric information (Schieg, 
2008). The concept of asymmetric in�
formation is of great value to modern 
economic theory (Stiglitz, 2000). After 
Akerlof (1970), much has been written 
on this subject. In 2001, George Aker�
lof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz 
shared a Nobel prize in economics for 
this important work.
Asymmetric information and its 
applications are covered by substan�
tial literature. In the presentation of 
the theory, this paper relies on Jäger 
(2008) and Schieg (2008), which pro�
vide useful overviews of the theory. 
The reminder of this section of the pa�
per follows them in the presentation of 
the key concepts used.
Asymmetric Information and 
Communication Risk
As argued in the Introduction, informa�
tion asymmetries apply whenever the 
principal and the agent are not in pos�
session of the same information at the 
same time. In construction projects, 
we have four key parties that work to�
gether, and it is assumed that they will 
share important information in order 
to meet main project’s targets: time, 
cost, and quality. However, because 
of self interest, they will not be willing 
to share all the information all of the 
time. Specifically, the following types 
of information asymmetries apply for 
acting parties: hidden characteristics, 
hidden information, and hidden inten-
tion. Respectively, these three types of 
information asymmetries generate fol�
lowing risks: adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and hold-up. 
Adverse selection describes infor�
mation asymmetries when the principal 
does not have the exact qualifications of 
the agent. It occurs before the contract 
between them is signed. The result can 
be the wrong choice of the contractual 
partner. In the case of the moral hazard 
there are information asymmetries af-
ter the contract is signed. The principal 
cannot control all the agent’s activities 
and an information imbalance in favour 
of the agent can occur. If the agent uses 
this situation opportunistically, then 
this type of asymmetric information 
is called moral hazard. If the principal 
makes large investments in money or 
other resources because of the trusty 
relationship with the agent, and if these 
investments get lost in the case that 
the agent acts uncooperatively, these 
result with the problem called hold�up. 
The principal has already made an ir�
reversible investment and this enables 
the agent to confront the principal with 
excessive demands, for instance.
Asymmetric Information in 
Construction Projects
Based on the principal�agent theory, re�
lationships between the project owner 
and contractor, as well as the two proj�
ect managers are systemized accord�
ing to related asymmetric information 
and corresponding types of risk. Hidden 
characteristics are associated with ad�
verse selection; hidden action and/or 
hidden information are associated with 
moral hazard; and hidden intentions are 
associated with hold�up.
Hidden characteristics cause the ad�
verse selection problem before the con�
tract is signed between involved par�
Figure 2: Principal-agent theory framework for construction projects (PO: Project owner, C: Contractor, PMpo: 
Project owner’s project manager, PMc: Contractor’s project manager)
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ties. It means that the project owner 
does not have all the information about 
the contractor before the contractor is 
hired. Similarly, the project owner does 
not have all the information about the 
project manager before hiring. The same 
holds for the contractor and the project 
manager working on the contractor’s be�
half. Therefore, in the case of adverse 
selection we have three different parties 
involved and three information asym�
metries. The adverse selection problem 
occurs in the early phases of the project. 
Generally, these phases are the most 
important from the risk point of view. 
The early phases of a project are of par�
ticular interest because the level of in�
fluence on total project costs is highest 
early on, whereas the impact of early 
decisions on total project costs is the 
highest (Hendrickson and Au, 1989). 
The potential influence of stake�hold�
ers is also highest in the early project 
phases, before a detailed agenda is set 
and the cost for making changes is low 
(Kolltveit and Grønhaug, 2004).
Hidden information or hidden ac�
tion causes the moral hazard risk. This 
occurs after the contract is signed be�
tween involved parties. For example, 
the client cannot be sure that firms, once 
hired, will fully mobilize their capabili�
ties on the client’s behalf or on behalf 
of other clients of theirs (Winch, 2010). 
In our case, four parties are potentially 
involved in the moral hazard problem. 
After the relevant contracts are signed 
and the project owner has hired the con�
tractor and the project manager, and af�
ter the contractor has hired the project 
manager, they cannot be sure that all 
information will be shared in an appro�
priate way because of their self inter�
est. People will not act in the interest of 
others, their principals or partners, to 
the exclusion of their own preferences 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, 2000). The 
moral hazard problem also occurs be�
tween two project managers because 
they have their self interest, as well.
Hidden intentions can cause hold�up 
problems. The project owner can invest 
some money at any stage of the project 
and trust that the contractor will coop�
erate, but it can happen that the con�
tractor will act opportunistically. After 
the project owner realizes that the con�
tractor is behaving opportunistically, it 
can be too late for the project owner to 
withdraw investment. The same holds 
in the opposite direction. The contrac�
tor can also invest some money at any 
stage of the project and trust that the 
project owner will cooperate, but it can 
happen that the project owner will act 
opportunistically.
Risk Minimization
There are several ways to minimize risks 
that arise from adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and hold�up problems. These 
are known as screening and monitor-
ing ( Jäger, 2008; Schieg, 2008). As 
both screening and monitoring repre�
sent costs, they are known in the lit�
erature as “agency costs.” The purpose 
of screening is to gather information of 
use to the principal in an effort to learn 
more about the agent’s qualifications—
for instance, references, certificates, 
work probes, and credit worthiness. It 
helps reduce the adverse selection risk. 
Similarly, the purpose of monitoring the 
agents is to ascertain that they are be�
having in accordance with the contract. 
That is, it helps reduce moral hazard 
and hold�up risks. In the exploratory 
survey presented below, monitoring will 
be shown to be of particular interest in 
this research.
Exploratory Survey
An exploratory survey was used to es�
tablish the relative importance of com�
munication risk sources and types of 
relationship in construction projects 
(Appendix). Since this research is ex�
ploratory in nature, a questionnaire 
survey was considered an appropriate 
tool (Bailey et al., 1995). The objective 
was to establish an understanding of 
the relative importance of a number of 
communication risks established in the 
literature. The respondents were project 
managers with considerable experience 
and expertise in the field. They were se�
lected for this study because they play 
central roles in all construction proj�
ects. Their perceptions of communica�
tion risks are thus important. However, 
the survey respondents cannot be said 
to be representative of all project man�
agers, the population of which is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
Out of thirty�five construction proj�
ect managers approached, twenty�
seven participated in the survey (re�
sponse rate: 75 percent). Several of 
them were involved in an initial pilot 
survey to ensure its comprehensibility. 
On the average, the respondents had 
fifteen years of experience on a wide va�
riety of construction projects. The larg�
est projects they had managed had an 
average value of $1 billion. Many of the 
largest projects were in infrastructure, 
but all other types of projects were rep�
resented. Collectively, the respondents 
worked on construction projects in a 
wide range of countries on most con�
tinents. Among more than thirty coun�
tries, they worked in Egypt, Hong Kong, 
India, Iraq, Italy, Pakistan, Poland, Rus�
sia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. They can therefore be 
understood as experts in the field. The 
respondents were asked to offer their 
perceptions, and they felt comfortable 
expressing them.
Following the principal�agent the�
ory, there were five main questions, 
which were divided into two sections. 
The first section concerned three issues 
of information asymmetry (adverse se�
lection, moral hazard, and hold�up), 
which correspond to their three sources 
(hidden characteristics, hidden infor�
mation, and hidden intentions), while 
the second section concerned two types 
of communication risk minimization 
(screening and monitoring). The ques�
tions were formulated in such a fashion 
that the above key concepts were intro�
duced only descriptively, so as to avoid 
the recognition of these concepts from 
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the literature by the respondents. The 
respondents were asked to rate the im�
portance of each issue addressed in five 
questions in terms of the four relation�
ships between the key project parties. 
The scale used was from one to nine, 
where the highest value was considered 
to be the most important.
The scale used here is ostensibly 
ordinal, and ordinal data do not permit 
statistical analysis using means and 
standard deviations, but only medians 
and ranges instead (Stevens, 1946). 
However, the scale used here can be 
meaningfully interpreted as the inter�
val scale, as it involves only levels of 
importance, from least to most impor�
tant. Each level of importance can be 
interpreted as the same as any other, 
and the scale can thus be interpreted 
as linear. In such a case, especially if 
the scale is sufficiently wide, it is per�
missible to treat the ordinal scale as an 
interval one (Knapp, 1990). Therefore, 
means and standard deviations can be 
used in the statistical analysis applied 
to the interpretation of the data.
However, this paper does not rely 
on statistical analysis. The means and 
standard deviations presented below 
are used mainly as indicators of the rela�
tive importance of various relationships 
studied. As such, they provide pointers 
for future research. Given the paucity 
of research concerning the relation�
ship between the project managers as 
agents directly involved in the construc�
tion phase of a project, the exploratory 
survey presented here offers sugges�
tions rather than definitive claims, let 
alone proofs.
Project Managers’ Perceptions 
of Communication Risks
Before turning to the main findings, it 
is useful to review the responses to the 
last section of the survey, which elicits 
the respondents’ comments. In particu�
lar, the respondents were asked to list 
specific communication risks between 
the four project parties, as well as the 
most appropriate risk�minimization ap�
proaches in each of the four relation�
ships between them. The most impor�
tant responses are presented in this 
section so as to give substance to the ar�
gument that follows, which concerns the 
relative importance of each relationship 
in different principal�agent contexts.
A significant proportion of pertinent 
responses refer to the relationship be�
tween the project owner and contrac�
tor, on the one hand, and the project 
owner’s and contractor’s project man�
agers, on the other. The latter relation�
ship deserves special attention, as will 
be argued in the next section with the 
main findings. So far, this relationship 
has not received any attention from the 
research community concerned with the 
construction field, but the research re�
ported here shows that it is crucial in 
the monitoring phase of the project, 
when construction actually takes place. 
What follows are pertinent comments 
regarding all relationships covered by 
this research.
Project Owner-Contractor
According to one respondent, “there 
is no direct communication between 
the project owner and contractor be�
cause project managers act as a buf�
fer between parties. Appropriate com�
munication protocol must be set up.” 
Another respondent suggests that “all 
critical issues should be openly dis�
cussed without hidden agendas due 
to the very complex nature of the con�
struction process.” Yet another states 
that “the highest risk is the inability 
of the owner to clearly explain what 
is expected from the contractor—un�
clear scope definition, vague expecta�
tions, etc.” Two respondents mention 
“incomplete progress reports” and 
“incomplete contract and design doc�
uments.” What is needed, according 
to one respondent, is “clear and con�
sistent change�management from the 
project owner’s side.” Given that the 
respondents perceive this relationship 
as crucial in construction projects be�
fore the contract is signed, as will be 
shown below, there is a need for better 
communication between them.
Project Owner-Project Owner’s 
Manager
One respondent states that there is 
a “lack of on�time reports.” Another 
states that “clear definitions of respon�
sibilities” are needed. Clearly, this rela�




According to one respondent, “the proj�
ect manager should be assigned from 
the core of the organization, so that 
he or she would be in position to make 
better assessment concerning possible 
conflicts and guide the higher manage�
ment.” Again, much more attention is 
required here in future research.
Project Owner’s Project Manager-
Contractor’s Project Manager
Six respondents state that “this rela�
tionship is the most important” after 
the contract is signed. According to one 
of them, “project owners and contrac�
tors usually have more than one project, 
so it is most important for their project 
managers to work together.” Another 
respondent argues that “this relation�
ship is the most subjective one.” Ac�
cording to one respondent, “the social 
relationship should extend outside of 
the project—i.e. by means of their fami�
lies.” Another respondent suggests that 
“both project managers should have 
the same level of authority; if this is 
not the case, the decision�making pro�
cess can be negatively affected.” One 
respondent states that “the main risk is 
that the project owner asks for improve�
ments that are assumed to be included 
in the project, but the contractor as�
sumes that they should be paid for on 
top of the project.” As already stated, 
the two project managers play a key 
role after the contract is signed. This is 
especially important in the construction 
phase of the project.
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Main Findings
The main findings of the exploratory 
survey can be presented in two steps. 
The first concerns the first four ques�
tions, whereas the second concerns the 
fifth and last question, which points 
to an important finding regarding the 
relationship between the two project 
managers.
In the first four questions, the first 
three of which concern the sources of 
communication risk and the fourth con�
cerns risk minimization (see Appendix), 
the responses suggest that the most 
important relationship in any project is 
perceived to be that between the proj�
ect owner and the contractor as princi�
pal and agent. This is indicated by the 
highest mean values of responses and 
low standard deviations between them 
(Table 2). The second most important re�
lationship in these four questions was 
that between the project owner and the 
project manager working on the behalf 
of the project owner. Again, means 
and standard deviations are used here 
mainly to indicate relative importance 
of different relationships rather than to 
demonstrate their relative strength by 
means of statistical analysis.
Table 2. Results of the explorative 
survey questionnaire.
The responses to the fifth and last 
question, which concerns risk minimiza�
tion after contracts are signed between 
the main parties, show a novel result: 
according to the project managers sur�
veyed, the most important relationship 
appears to be that between the project 
owner’s and contractor’s project man�
agers, both of whom are agents. This 
is shown by the highest mean value, 
which represents an important finding. 
In addition, a bar chart showing all re�
sponses to this question can be found 
in Figure 3. It shows that eleven out of 
twenty�seven respondents (or 42 per�
cent) consider this relationship the most 
important, as witnessed by the highest 
mark assigned to it. The distribution of 
responses is sharply skewed toward 
this claim. These findings suggest that 
the relationship between project man�
agers, as shown in Figure 2, has thus far 
been neglected in the literature. It can 
be hoped that the diagram will therefore 
be useful in guiding future research.
Figure 3: The relationship between 
the Project Owner’s Project Manager 
and Contractor’s Project Manager in the 
monitoring phase of a project as rated 
by the survey respondents on the scale 
from 1 to 9 (where 9 is “most important”)
It is interesting to note that the 
standard deviation of ratings of differ�















qualifications are not fully 
known before contract is 
signed between parties 
Mean 7.48 6.85 6.12 5.96
Standard 
deviation
2.26 1.93 2.22 2.44
Behavior of contract 
partner cannot be fully 
assessed after contract is 
signed between parties 
Mean 7.30 6.96 6.24 6.96
Standard 
deviation
1.54 1.48 1.76 1.80
Contract partner’s  
intentions are not fully 
known after contract is 
signedbetween parties 
Mean 7.41 6.85 6.48 7.04
Standard 
deviation
1.72 1.96 1.44 2.07
Gathering information 
to learn about partner’s 
behavior before contract is 
signed between parties 
Mean 8.41 7.23 6.68 6.08
Standard 
deviation
1.05 1.58 1.93 2.23
Gathering information 
to learn about partner’s 
behavior after contract is 
signed between parties
Mean 7.15 6.81 6.56 7.27
Standard 
deviation
1.97 1.92 1.94 2.16
Table 2: Results of the explorative survey questionnaire
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was highest in the case of the relation�
ship between the project owner’s and 
contractor’s project managers. This sug�
gests that respondents were least in 
agreement concerning their own role 
in the management of construction 
projects. However, it should be pointed 
out that the respondents appear not to 
have a bias regarding the importance 
of the relationship between the project 
owner and contractor, which they con�
sider the most important one in the first 
four questions.
Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to 
guide future research. The exploratory 
survey offers an indication of the rela�
tive importance of different relation�
ships between the key participants in 
construction projects. Although the 
results cannot be statistically demon�
strated due to the nature of the explor�
atory survey presented here, they still 
point to an important area of investiga�
tion that deserves greater attention. 
Future research is needed in several 
inter�related areas.
The relationships between the four par�
ties shown in Figure 2 have been exam�
ined in this paper only from the horizon�
tal axis upwards. This emphasizes the 
perspective of the principals involved. 
The lower part of the diagram, which 
stresses the perspective of the agents, 
needs to be explored in the future. In 
terms of the principal�agent theory, 
this primarily concerns risk minimiza�
tion strategies by all agents involved. In 
particular, this involves signalling and 
reputation—that is, marketing and good 
performance (Jäger, 2008).
Future research should also con�
sider more complex relationships be�
tween construction project participants, 
and especially the agents. In particular, 
this involves consultants, such as de�
signers, as well as sub�contractors, of 
which there are many in construction 
projects. The relationships shown in 
Figure 2 can be widened to better un�
derstand the complexities of the con�
struction process beyond the four key 
participants investigated here.
Of course, the relationships shown 
in Figure 2 are of great interest to human 
resource management as a field. The 
relationship between project owner’s 
and contractor’s project managers, as 
well as their teams, which often include 
temporary members of other firms, re�
mains an unexplored area within human 
resource management.
As key agents in every project, ex�
perienced project managers can be 
helpful in finding ways to improve their 
communication, both formal and infor�
mal. The Delphi method can be used to 
extend this exploratory research and 
deepen our understanding of possible 
improvements in communication be�
tween project managers involved in the 
same project. Project managers’ percep�
tions will be crucial in such research, as 
well. Throughout, the principal�agent 
theory promises to be most useful in 
guiding research design.
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) offer use�
ful guidelines for further research into 
behavioral economics in general. This 
is a field with many promises in project 
management as applied to the construc�
tion field, as well. They are concerned 
with notions such as confidence, fair�
ness, corruption and bad faith, and 
money illusion. All of these notions in�
volve asymmetric information. Assum�
ing such problems away only makes ac�
tual problems encountered in the proj�
ect management practice that much 
more difficult to resolve.
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Appendix:  
Survey Questionnaire
COMMUNICATION RISKS IN 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 
— INTRODUCTION
This research has to do with the rela�
tionship between the project owner, 
contractor, and their project managers 
(see diagram below). These four par�
ties are crucial to the success of every 
project. This research focuses on risks 
associated with their communication. 
Research to date has shown that com�
munication is of vital importance to the 
success of construction projects. The 
focus here is on information asymme�
try in the project�management process. 
An example of information asymmetry 
is when one party does not fully know 
what the other knows or does. It has 
been shown that this form of asymme�
try is central to explaining key prob�
lems in many other fields. Extending 
this research to construction manage�




Note that all private information will re�
main confidential. Only statistical data 





4. Current job title:
5. Years of experience in project 
management:
6. Value of largest project managed  
in $US:
7. Countries where worked:
B. Information asymmetry – Sources of 
communication risk
Note that information asymmetry 
changes once the contracts between 
different parties involved in a project 
are signed. Only three contracts are in�
volved in the process as described in 
the diagram  above. These are contracts 
between the project owner and contrac�
tor, as well as contracts between them 
and their project managers.
C. Risk minimization – Ways to reduce 
information asymmetry
As in Part B above, information asymme�
try changes once the contracts between 
different parties involved in a project 
are signed. Again, there are only three 
contracts involved: between the project 
owner and contractor, as well as con�
tracts between them and their project 
managers.
D. Communication risks
Please list specific communication risks 
between the project parties that you con�
sider most important for project success. 
If possible, also list most appropriate risk�
minimization approaches in each case.
 X Project owner – contractor:
 X Project owner – Owner’s project 
manager:
 X Contractor – Contractor’s project 
manager:
 X Owner’s project manager –  
Contractor’s project manager:
PO: Project owner; C: Contractor; PMpo: Owner’s project manager; PMc: Contractor’s project manager













Please use the scale from 1 to 9 (where 9 is “most important”) to rate the importance of each relationship between  
project parties in terms of communication risk involved:
From – To
Project owner - 
Contractor










Contract partner’s qualifications are not 
fully known before contract is signed 
between  parties
Behavior of contract partner cannot be fully 
assessed after contract is signed between 
parties
Contract partner’s intentions are not fully 
known after contract is signed between 
parties
Please comment on the communication relationships above that you consider most important:
Please use the scale from 1 to 9 (where 9 is “most important”) to rate the importance of each relationship between  
project parties in terms of communication-risk minimization:
From – To
Project owner - 
Contractor










Gathering information to learn about 
partner’s behavior before contract is signed 
between parties
Gathering information to learn about 
partner’s behavior after contract is signed 
between parties
Please comment on the communication relationships above that you consider most important:
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